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1 
–––––––– 
Introduction and Summary 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the relationship between natural resource endowment and armed 
civil conflict. In particular, it concentrates on unraveling whether or not natural 
resources have an effect on conflict through the incentives and opportunities they 
provide for rebel movements. The thesis departs from the standard approach to 
statistical conflict analysis in which natural resources are considered at the country level 
without controlling for rebels’ access to the resource base. Because of the lack of 
suitable data on natural resource localities, a substantial part of the thesis is devoted to 
the collection of such data. 
My project was inspired by Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) seminal work on the 
role of natural resources in civil war. Instead of considering resource abundance as 
detrimental to peace in the traditional economic sense through Dutch disease, which can 
increase the vulnerability of a country to conflict, they propose that natural resources 
provide opportunities, occasionally even motivation, for cash-strapped rebel movements 
to emerge and survive. 
Despite their intriguing insight, the Collier & Hoeffler work, especially the 
statistical analysis they conduct, has been attacked on various grounds. Clearly, their 
measure of resource revenues available to the rebel movement – primary product 
exports to GDP ratio – is not ideal. The ratio does not distinguish between different 
resource types. It includes many resources, such as oil, that are not readily available for 
rebel exploitation during a conflict, and it partially excludes revenues from some of the 
most lootable resources such as smuggled gemstones and drugs. The ratio also makes 
the analysis susceptible to reverse causality even though Collier & Hoeffler’s research 
design does limit the problem. Crucially, the analysis is not able to control whether the 
rebels in reality have access to resources, which is a central element in the Collier & 
Hoeffler proposition. For example, is it plausible to think that diamonds in Siberia, 
Russia, are linked to the Chechen conflict in the North Caucasus? 
Other researchers have contested the robustness of the Collier & Hoeffler results 
and the correctness of their interpretations. Fearon (2005) shows that the Collier & 
Hoeffler results are not necessarily robust in relation to other model specifications and 
Sambanis (2004) and Hegre & Sambanis (2006) find that natural resources are not 
always robustly related to conflict. Fearon & Laitin (2003), Humphreys (2005), and de 
Soysa & Neumayer (2007) among others challenge the accuracy of the underlying 
causal mechanism proposed by Collier & Hoeffler. They argue that resource-dependent 
countries are more prone to conflict because of resources adversely affecting the state, 
its institutions, and its (military) capacity. These studies also tend to find that 
dependence on oil production is the main cause of the perceived link between natural 
resources and conflict. 
Are these weaknesses in the analysis, conflicting results, and other plausible 
explanations enough to discredit the Collier & Hoeffler proposition altogether? Their 
argument is intuitively appealing and there is case study evidence supporting their 
assertion that natural resources can play an important role in rebel group financing 
(Ross 2004a, b). By using more appropriate data and analysis methods, can N-large 
statistical studies support their argument? This is the central theme in my thesis. 
From the very beginning of this project I was aware that I needed to address two 
crucial issues if I wanted to explore statistically the plausibility of the Collier & 
Hoeffler argument. First, I needed to disaggregate the resource variable and concentrate 
on a few, likely, causes. Second, I needed to collect data on resource localities to be able 
to control for whether or not rebels in reality had access to natural resources. Therefore, 
collecting location data on a few, highly relevant natural resources became one of the 
top priorities for my project. By using such data this thesis seeks to shed light on the 
following research question: 
 
 Do natural resources have a detrimental impact on peace through their 
effects on rebel groups? 
 
In addition to answering this fundamental question, my thesis seeks to 
investigate and provide a more nuanced picture of the link between natural resources 
and armed civil conflict with the following broad research questions as a guide: 
 
 How do natural resources affect different aspects – onset, duration, and 
severity – of armed civil conflict? 
 Is it necessary to control for the location of natural resources, or can we 
rely on country-level aggregates? 
 Do the types of natural resources matter? Are rebel movements 
motivated and sustained only by resources that can be looted during a 
conflict or can a promise of future resource revenues have a similar 
impact? 
 
Summary of the articles 
This thesis consists of six independent yet related articles. Four have been published in 
international peer-reviewed journals, while the remaining two are under review. Two 
are single authored. Chapter 2 demonstrates the need to collect data and conduct 
analysis at the subnational level. Chapters 3 and 4 describe and document two natural 
resource datasets – diamond deposits and hydrocarbon reserves, respectively – that can 
be used in disaggregated analysis of armed civil conflict. The remaining three chapters 
use these data and analyze various aspects of armed civil conflict. 
Chapter 2: Accounting for scale: Measuring geography in quantitative studies of civil 
war 
This article was jointly written with Halvard Buhaug and was published in Political 
Geography (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005). In this article, we demonstrate the possibility of 
incorrectly conducting statistical analysis on armed civil conflict at the country level 
when the independent variables have a considerable subnational variation. Several 
theoretical arguments refer to local conditions relevant in shaping civil conflicts, yet the 
subsequent testing commonly uses country-level measures. For example, rough terrain 
and natural resource endowment are commonly linked to civil conflict, but as forests or 
mountains only rarely span entire countries and many natural resources are location 
specific, using country-level aggregates is questionable. In this article, we show how 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be used to generate conflict-specific 
measures and how these can be used in conventional statistical analysis. We find that 
conflict zones are not representative of the host country and that several covariates 
change their performance when we move from country-level analysis to conflict level. 
Chapter 3: Conflict diamonds: A new dataset 
This article was written jointly with Elisabeth Gilmore, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Jan 
Ketil Rød and was published in Conflict Management and Peace Science (Gilmore et 
al., 2005). It introduces and describes a new dataset, DIADATA, which provides a 
comprehensive list of diamond deposits throughout the world. The dataset has several 
useful features. First, it concentrates on a single resource and thus avoids aggregating 
resources that may have different, even opposite, impacts on armed civil conflict. It 
concentrates on a high-value low-weight resource that has frequently been mentioned in 
conflict literature as a conflict-generating and -sustaining factor yet it has rarely been 
included in the statistical analysis of conflict. Second, the dataset includes information 
 
on the geological type of the deposit: whether it is secondary, which generally are 
relatively easily accessible for mining, or primary, which often require more 
sophisticated extraction methods. Third, in contrast to other diamond datasets, the base 
unit for the dataset is not the country but the diamond deposit. DIADATA includes 
spatial information in the form of latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates for each 
deposit. Finally, DIADATA includes information on when the specific diamond deposit 
was discovered and, where relevant, the first year the site produced diamonds. This 
makes it possible to use the diamond data in time-series analysis. In total, the dataset 
includes 1,175 entries divided into more than 200 primary and almost 900 secondary 
deposits. DIADATA, a detailed codebook, and country profiles are publicly available. 
DIADATA comes also as a compact dataset that aggregates sites in the same region. 
Chapter 4: Fighting over oil: Introducing a new dataset 
This article was coauthored with Jan Ketil Rød and Nadja Thieme and was published in 
Conflict Management and Peace Science (Lujala, Rød & Thieme, 2007). This article 
presents PETRODATA, a dataset of oil and gas reserve locations throughout the world. 
It includes information on discovery year and, where relevant, the first production year, 
for 890 onshore and 383 offshore regions. This enables the user to ensure spatial and 
temporal overlap with conflict data. To demonstrate the usefulness of the dataset in 
subnational analysis, we run a simple duration analysis in which we use both the 
temporal and the spatial features of the dataset. We find that oil and gas production in 
the conflict zone makes governmental conflicts longer while having no effect on the 
length of territorial conflicts. Although we use the dataset in the context of armed civil 
conflict, this dataset could also be used in other studies, for example to analyze 
international relations and disputes. The dataset is publicly available. 
Chapter 5: A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource 
This article was written jointly with Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore and 
was published in Journal of Conflict Resolution (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005). In 
this article, we concentrate on the role of diamonds as one key resource in the conflict 
literature. We use the DIADATA dataset on diamond production to study onset and 
prevalence of major civil war. The article demonstrates the importance of 
disaggregating diamond deposits according to their geological form. Primary diamonds, 
which generally cannot be considered lootable, and the more lootable secondary 
diamonds affect civil war differently. We find that generally diamonds are not related to 
 
the onset of civil war for the post-World War 2 period. However, secondary diamonds 
tend to promote the onset and incidence of ethnic conflict. Analysis restricted to the 
post-Cold war period shows that secondary diamond production strongly and 
significantly increases the risk of conflict onset and is positively related to conflict 
prevalence. Production of primary diamonds, on the other hand, is related to lower risk 
of conflict. 
Chapter 6: The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural 
resources 
This article analyzes the effect of natural resources on the duration and onset of conflict. 
In addition to using the location data on oil and gas and diamond deposits described in 
Chapters 3 and 4, it also includes newly collected data on other gemstones such as 
rubies, sapphires, and jade (Flöter, Lujala & Rød, 2005). The duration analysis fully 
integrates the advantage of the spatial and temporal aspects of these datasets. The article 
shows that valuable resources located in the conflict zone are associated with the 
doubling of the length of conflict. Strikingly, when I measure resource endowment at 
the country level, the resources are seemingly unrelated to the duration. The role of 
location is further illustrated by the onset analysis: oil and gas production located in the 
offshore areas is not related to the onset even though onshore production increases the 
risk of onset. The results in this article provide strong evidence that natural resources 
play a central role in civil wars because of the incentives and opportunities they present 
for rebel groups. Interestingly and importantly, the onset analysis shows that secondary 
diamond production considerably increases the risk of conflict onset. This stands in 
contrast to other statistical studies, which have not found such a link. 
Chapter 7: Deadly combat over natural resources: Gems, petroleum, drugs, and the 
severity of armed civil conflict 
This article studies how natural resources are related to two aspects of conflict severity: 
the number of combat-related deaths and the intensity of conflict. Based on the insights 
provided by the previous chapters, I expect that location of natural resource extraction 
crucially determines the range of possible effects. I also expect that the type of resource 
influences the direction and size of the impact. In addition, I suspect that oil and gas 
production outside the conflict zone and in offshore areas may be related to conflict. 
The results confirm that it is essential to control for the location of natural resources. Oil 
and gas production is a prime example of this. Production substantially increases the 
 
severity when located inside the conflict zone. When located outside the conflict zone 
and offshore areas, production has the opposite effect: these conflicts accumulate fewer 
combat deaths and are less intensive. Furthermore, when I use country-level aggregates, 
I find no relationship between oil and gas production and conflict severity. I also find 
evidence that the resource type matters. Drug cultivation in a conflict zone is associated 
with less severe conflicts. Gemstone mining increases the number of combat deaths but 
is not necessarily related to more intensive conflicts. The most violent of all conflicts 
are secessionist conflicts in regions with oil and gas production. Results in this article 
imply that natural resources affect conflict severity by altering incentives for both the 
rebel group and the state. 
Concluding remarks and some future research agendas 
This thesis has sought to investigate the role of natural resources in armed civil conflicts 
after the Second World War. The principal research question has been whether rebel 
movements can be motivated and sustained by natural resource exploitation. The thesis 
consists of several empirical articles that analyze various aspects of conflict – onset, 
duration, and severity – at the country and conflict levels. Data collection on drug 
cultivation, oil and gas, diamond, and gemstone localities throughout the world has been 
an essential part of the project. 
In my opinion, one of my most important conclusions in the thesis is the 
proposition that natural resources have a direct effect on rebel movement. If natural 
resources affected conflict only through their adverse effect on the state, we would 
expect all resource revenue sources to have the same effect on conflict. Contrary to this, 
I find that natural resources tend to have an effect on conflict only when the resource 
sites are located in the conflict region. For example, oil and gemstone production make 
conflicts longer and more violent, but only when they are located in the conflict zone. 
Moreover, offshore oil and gas production, which is less likely to have a direct effect on 
rebel groups, has no effect on conflict onset, although onshore production positively 
predicts the risk of conflict. This, of course, is not to say that natural resources cannot 
have a negative impact on peace through their effect on the state. In fact, I find that 
conflicts in which the state and rebels contest access to resources that are highly 
valuable for both sides are prolonged and the most severe. This indicates that the state is 
prepared to use more force when its economic interests are threatened.1
                                                 
1 Furthermore, resource curse in the form of slow or negative growth, deteriorating institutions, and weak-state 
capacity is a very real and challenging issue for many resource-rich countries and a potential source of conflict-
generating grievances and opportunities. 
 
That location of natural resources matters has a clear and important implication 
for empirical conflict research in general: it is imperative to control for local conditions 
if we want to explain rebel behavior in conflict. In this thesis, relying on country-level 
aggregates would have led to wrong conclusions about the role of natural resources in 
armed civil conflict. I find that country-level aggregates are rarely related to conflict 
duration or severity. However, these nonresults tend to evaporate as soon as I replace 
them by conflict-level measures. An illustrating example is the effect of oil and gas 
production on conflict severity: at the country level, production does not have any effect 
on severity, but disaggregated measures show that production inside the conflict zone 
makes conflict more severe while production outside the conflict region and in offshore 
areas actually tends to make conflict less severe. 
Yet another important conclusion provided by this project is that natural 
resources should be considered individually and not lumped together. Oil and gas, 
gemstones, and drug cultivation in the conflict zone affect conflict severity very 
differently: drug cultivation is related to fewer combat deaths and lower conflict 
intensity, gemstone mining to more deaths but not necessarily to more intensive 
conflicts, and oil and gas production to a higher number of deaths and more intensive 
conflicts. Diamonds provide another illustrative example: the geological form of the 
diamond deposit is related to its effect on conflict. Secondary diamonds – the more 
lootable form of the two deposit types – makes conflict more likely, longer, and more 
severe. Primary diamonds, on the other hand, are generally not related to conflict. 
Finally, future revenue flows are related to conflict via the rebel channel. 
Revenues from oil and gas production are rarely available to rebel groups during a 
conflict and rebels can access these revenues only through successful state capture or 
secession, or by increasing their negotiation power in how resource revenues originating 
from the region are shared. However, production of oil and gas makes conflicts longer 
and more severe, indicating that rebels tend to value the promise of future revenues 
highly. Moreover, I find that production is not always necessary for this effect: the mere 
presence of oil and gas reserves in the conflict region is sufficient to lengthen the 
conflict substantially. 
This thesis has documented the need to collect resource data at the subnational 
level. As a part of this project we have collected data on diamonds, other gemstones, 
hydrocarbons, and drug localities throughout the world. Future research on resource-
induced conflicts should seek to collect similar data on other natural resources. Priority 
should be given to resources that are rare, have a high value-to-weight ratio, and can be 
easily smuggled. These include natural resources such as gold, chromite, and tantalite. 
 
This thesis demonstrates the necessity of conducting conflict studies at the 
subnational level. Since the start of this project, the research on armed civil conflict has 
moved more and more in this direction and the first truly disaggregated conflict studies 
have been recently published (Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). As more 
detailed data on conflict zones and rebel-held areas become available, it will be possible 
to study the resource–conflict nexus in more detail. Do conflicts start near the extraction 
sites, or is it only later that the conflict zone encompasses the resource areas? Does the 
fighting concentrate at or near the exploitation sites, or are these areas relatively free of 
fighting? Answers to these and other questions would give valuable insight into what 
extent resource looting is used to finance the start-up costs of rebellion and to what 
extent it is used to finance fighting after the conflict outbreak. They could also shed 
light on the question of the extent that rebels are motivated by personal enrichment 
rather than other, more ‘noble’ objectives such as economic and political equality. 
For policy purposes it is necessary that we have a better understanding of causal 
mechanisms of how natural resources shape rebel movements and their behavior. We 
need to know under which circumstances individuals join rebel movements that are 
motivated by resource looting and personal enrichment. Are these different for 
participants that join rebellions seeking autonomy for a region with oil production? Are 
rebel movements originating from regions with valuable natural resources generally 
different from other rebel organizations? How and why do groups that begin as justice-
seeking movements sometimes end up as looting bandits that indiscriminately use 
violence toward civilians? Do natural resources affect which form the rebellion takes: 
factional warlordism, guerilla war, terrorism, etc? Weinstein (2007) provides valuable 
insight into how natural resources can shape rebel organization, but further research – 
statistical and theoretical, as well as case studies – is required before we can fully 
conceptualize the many possible mechanisms that operate between natural resources and 
rebel group formation and conflict, and how these complement and interact with 
mechanisms that work through the state. 
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Abstract
The empirical evidence from studies linking geographic factors like terrain and natural
resources to civil war is generally weak and not robust to varying samples or coding
procedures. We argue that these investigations suﬀer from a major weakness: although most
civil wars are geographically limited to small parts of the host countries, the analyses rely
almost exclusively on country-level data. We demonstrate how Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) can be used to generate precise measures of space-varying factors at the scale of
the conﬂict. A comparison of several relevant variables measured both at the scale of the
country and the conﬂict demonstrates that country statistics are poor approximations of the
conﬂict zones. An analysis of duration of civil war further shows that certain ﬁndings are
indeed dependent upon the scale of measurement. We conclude by discussing how GIS and
spatial analysis may be applied in future research to increase our understanding of location,
duration, and risk of armed civil conﬂict.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Geography; Conﬂict; Geographical information systems; Natural resources; Terrain
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The link between geography and war has deep roots. From Sun’s (500 BC/1963)
classic treatise Art of War, via early-modern theoretical works on geopolitics and
imperialism, to contemporary conﬂict studies, scholars of international relations
have repeatedly asserted that geographical factors are vital aspects of the origin and
conduct of war (see Diehl, 1991 for an overview). Features of terrain, subsoil assets,
population distribution, and ethnic diversity are aspects of geography that have
received particular attention. Typically, the risk and duration of civil war are
thought to be high in remote, rural districts, populated by an ethnic or religious
minority, with rough mountainous or forested terrain, and containing valuable
natural resource deposits. So far, however, empirical studies have been less than
successful in establishing a clear link between the geographic distribution of physical
and human factors and civil war.
The theoretical framework for empirical studies on civil war and geography is
often motivated by how local factors such as rebels’ access to easily exploitable
natural resources and sanctuaries in rough terrain increase the viability of
insurgency. However, our review of the empirical literature shows that most studies
ignore local conditions and instead use country aggregates in analysis. We argue that
while it may be appropriate to focus on the national scale and use state-level
geographical variables when exploring the risk of conﬂict, this research strategy is
less suitable when the conﬂict is the unit of observation. This is particularly true for
conﬂicts that are spatially limited and in cases with several simultaneous conﬂicts
within the same country. We demonstrate that Geographical Information Systems
(GIS) can be used to generate measures of geography that are unique to each conﬂict
zone. To explore the eﬀect of scale of measurement, we compare sample means for
several indicators of terrain and natural resources. The t-test shows that all conﬂict-
speciﬁc variables diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the corresponding variables measured at
the habitual country level. We then conduct an analysis of duration of civil war,
which reveals that some ﬁndings are indeed dependent on the scale of measurement.
In particular, presence of gemstones and coca cultivation in the conﬂict zone
increases the length of conﬂict considerably, while they are found to have diminutive
eﬀects when measured at the country level. In addition, the use of precise conﬂict
location data allows us to add a new variable to the duration analysis that measures
the conﬂictecapital distance. The relative location of conﬂict matters: the further the
conﬂict is from the capital, the longer it lasts. This is a powerful eﬀect that
substantially alters the estimates for country size, type of incompatibility, and rainy
season. The results show that local conditions and the relative location of the battle
zones should be accounted for in conﬂict studies, and that future research on civil
conﬂict could greatly beneﬁt from the use of GIS and spatial methodology.
Previous studies of geography and civil war
Inspired by the likes of Alfred T. Mahan and Harold J. Mackinder, the 19th- and
early 20th-century classic geopolitical literature deals solely with international wars.
401H. Buhaug, P. Lujala / Political Geography 24 (2005) 399e418This is reﬂected in the quantitative conﬂict literature, which has until recently almost
exclusively studied militarized interstate disputes and wars. Yet, civil war is by far
the dominant form of conﬂict. Since the Congress of Vienna (1814e1815), only two
decades have produced as many interstate wars as civil wars, and in every 10-year
period since the Second World War the rate of civil war onsets has exceeded that of
international wars (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003). In fact, the war between
India and Pakistan over Kashmir was the sole international conﬂict among the 34
active conﬂicts in 2001 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand,
2002). As the World Bank Policy Research Report (Collier et al., 2003) argues,
researchers should pay more attention to civil wars.
Traditionally, quantitative IR and conﬂict studies deﬁne geography in a very
narrow sense, merely permitting the concept to include measures of contiguity and
distance. This is, of course, mainly due to the general focus on interaction between
states, where other factors, including economic issues, regime attributes, alliance
patterns, and balance of power, are presumed to be more salient and inﬂuential. Yet,
with the recent shift in the academic interest from international wars towards civil
wars, other aspects of geography are now considered as part of the equation. Natural
resource dependence, in particular, has received substantial attention. Among
others, Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed (2002), Auty (2004), Collier and Hoeﬄer
(1998, 2002, 2004), and Ross (2004a,b) have promoted the view that valuable and
easily exploitable natural resources constitute opportunities for rebellion by
providing ﬁnance for arms purchase and rebel recruitment. In fact, Addison et al.
(2002) claim that since a civil war may provide all ﬁghting groups economic
opportunities that are not present during peacetime, the parties may prefer
continued ﬁghting to peace. In this way, natural resources may increase the risk of
internal armed struggle and at the same time decrease the likelihood of peaceful
resolution once the conﬂict gets going. Some also emphasize the negative impact of
resource abundance on regime stability and economic growth, thus suggesting
a more indirect path of causation (see Auty, 2001; Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001).2
The empirical evidence for a causal connection from resource abundance to
conﬂict is less consistent than the theory, although several case studies suggest that
such a link exists (Fairhead, 2000; Le Billon, 2001; Renner, 2002; Smillie, 2002). In
a study of 78 civil war onsets since 1960, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) report
a signiﬁcant parabolic relationship between natural resource dependence and risk
of civil war. However, this ﬁnding is not particularly robust, as shown by Fearon
and Laitin (2003) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002). Using more disaggregated
2 In seeming contrast to the resource abundance perspective, some scholars argue that environmental
scarcity e that is, scarcity of renewable resources e is a major threat to domestic and interstate stability
(see Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999). The two literatures are not as opposed as it seems,
though, since they generally pertain to diﬀerent types of resources. Advocates of the scarcity perspective
concentrate on issues related to regional/global depletion of renewable resources (fresh water, soil, crops,
forest), whereas the abundance literature mainly focuses on non-renewable resources (gems, minerals,
fuels, drugs). While not dismissing the arguments for scarcity-based conﬂicts, we limit the discussion and
empirical testing in this article to availability of valuable and easily extractable resources.
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suggest that oil-exporting countries have substantially higher risks of internal
conﬂict. de Soysa and Neumayer’s (2004) work on natural resource rents further
suggests that revenues from non-fuel minerals are generally unrelated to the risk of
civil conﬂict. In one of the few studies that analyze the duration of civil war,
Collier, Hoeﬄer, and So¨derbom (2004) ﬁnd only a weak and statistically
insigniﬁcant eﬀect of primary commodity exports. In contrast, Fearon (2004)
makes a case for how extraction of certain contrabands (gems and drugs) has
enabled ethnic groups to conduct protracted warfare. In sum, the empirical
evidence for direct connection between natural resource abundance and civil war is
far from impressive, and ﬁndings seem to vary with the operationalization of the
resource proxy.
Several studies have pointed out that rebel movements prefer to operate from
peripheral bases in mountainous or densely forested regions, which presumably
provide safe havens out of reach of government forces. Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004),
Collier et al. (2004), DeRouen and Sobek (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) all
include a measure of mountainous terrain, and some additional control for forest
cover. These terrain measures have so far failed to produce consistent and robust
results. In Collier and Hoeﬄer’s study of civil war onset, neither terrain indicator
produced a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 85) reach the opposite
conclusion, stating that ‘mountainous terrain is signiﬁcantly related to higher rates
of civil war’. The two analyses apply fairly similar operationalizations of civil war,
but the Fearon and Laitin study covers a larger temporal span (1945e1999 versus
1960e1999), includes more civil war onsets (127 versus 78), and employs annual data
compared to Collier and Hoeﬄer’s ﬁve-year pooled time series. Nevertheless, the
discrepancy is disturbing. In a study of the duration of 55 civil wars since 1960,
Collier et al. ﬁnd that extensive forest cover and mountainous terrain are not
signiﬁcantly associated with longer wars. In contrast, DeRouen and Sobek’s analysis
of civil war outcomes shows that forest cover increases the likelihood of prolonged
conﬂict. Mountainous terrain, on the other hand, reduces duration by increasing the
likelihood of rebel victory and ceaseﬁre.
In addition to natural resources and rough terrain, the distribution and ethnic and
religious composition of the population have been tested in relation to civil war.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) demonstrate that countries with a large but dispersed
population face a higher risk of intrastate conﬂict, as do countries dominated by one
ethnic group. Further, they ﬁnd evidence that social fractionalization decreases the
risk of conﬂict onset. These results are supported by Fearon and Laitin (2003), who
ﬁnd a very strong positive eﬀect of population size, while ethnic and religious
diversity have positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀects on conﬂict proneness. The Collier
et al. (2004) study on conﬂict duration ﬁnds that large population size tends to
prolong conﬂicts, although this might be an artifact of how civil wars are coded in
their dataset. Neither Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) nor Fearon (2004) manages to
produce evidence that population size aﬀects duration. Fearon’s analysis further fails
to support the alleged links between ethnic fractionalization or ethnic war and
duration of civil war, though the inﬂuential sons-of-the-soil dummy is likely to
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Elbadawi and Sambanis suggest a parabolic eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization on
conﬂict duration.
Few empirical studies have explicitly considered the role of distance in civil wars.
Buhaug and Gates (2002) ﬁnd that secessionist and identity-based wars tend to be
located further away from the capital than other types of conﬂict. Their analysis also
shows that conﬂicts that cover a larger area generally last longer, although the size of
the conﬂict zone may be endogenous to the conﬂict duration. Others have found that
separatist conﬂicts, which presumably are located in remote regions, last longer
(Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000). In addition, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and
Fearon (2004) include an indicator of ‘non-contiguous territory’ for countries that
have populated (over 10,000 inhabitants) enclaves or territories that are separated
from the capital city by over 100 km of water. The dummy fails to make an impact
except in the model that also includes colonial wars.
Finally, some studies have found evidence of spatial autocorrelation and spillover
eﬀects of civil conﬂicts, strongly suggesting that border length, interstate contiguity,
and proximate conﬂict arenas play a role in shaping intrastate behavior (Anselin &
O’Loughlin, 1992; Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Ward & Gleditsch, 2002).
Unit of analysis: country or conﬂict?
Despite the evident upsurge in quantitative research on geographical aspects of
civil war, we argue that several of these studies suﬀer from serious weaknesses
regarding the data that are used. This may potentially have a big impact on the
validity of the inferences. Above all, our concern relates to the scale of measurement
of the various indicators of geography.
The interaction between geography and civil war is characterized by two facts that
most empirical studies fail to account for: civil conﬂicts are by deﬁnition sub-
national events, and the ﬁghting rarely spans entire countries. For example, the
ongoing secessionist conﬂicts in the Basque Provinces (Spain), Cabinda (Angola),
and Chechnya (Russia) cover only a fraction of the countries’ territories. If we are to
estimate spatial spillover eﬀects to neighboring countries (such as the risk of conﬂict
or the impact on the economy), ignoring the relative location of the conﬂict may lead
to biased conclusions. According to Murdoch and Sandler (2002) neighboring
conﬂict has a negative impact on economic growth, and the eﬀect increases with the
length of the common border. While this ﬁnding sounds reasonable, it makes little
sense to argue that Finland, due to its 1200 km border with Russia, is more aﬀected
by the civil war in Chechnya than Azerbaijan, with a 270 km-long common border.
When operating with country-level aggregates, the eﬀect of distance from the actual
conﬂict area to neighboring countries is totally ignored.
3 First used by Weiner (1978), the term ‘sons of the soil’ denotes peripheral ethnic minorities.
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natural resources, population distribution, and ethnic composition, have substantial
sub-national variation. Contemporary studies of civil war have so far failed to take
account of this. As previously mentioned, valuable natural resources can be a major
source of ﬁnance for rebel groups. Yet, in order to acquire resource revenues, the
rebels must control resource extraction areas or transport channels. If the rebels do
not have access to the resources, there is less reason to expect conﬂicts in resource-
abundant countries to be substantially diﬀerent from civil wars in countries with
lower resource endowment. It is highly unlikely that diamond and other mineral
deposits in Siberia have much impact on rebel activities in Chechnya, in contrast to
the gas and oil reserves in the Caucasus region. Likewise, the rough terrain argument
posits that mountainous and forested terrain is favorable to rebel forces, providing
shelter out of reach of government forces. However, unless the rebels operate from
such terrain, it really should not matter whether 20% or 80% of the country is
mountainous. Thus, the rough terrain proposition may be perfectly valid without
there being a general, probabilistic relationship between country-level statistics of
topography and risk or duration of intrastate conﬂict.
The essence of the problem is that the proxies for geography are generated at the
wrong level of measurement: the nation state.4 For example, the most popular
measure for resource dependence is the ratio of primary commodities exports to
GDP. Likewise, indicators of rough terrain are based on country statistics. Such
aggregated measures really only make sense if we can assume that the conﬂict area
constitutes a representative sample of the conﬂict-ridden country on all explanatory
factors, and in cases in which the conﬂict spans the entire country. However, such an
assumption is rarely valid. Consider the case of India. According to the Armed
Conﬂict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002), India has experienced seven territorial
intrastate conﬂicts since 1990 (Fig. 1). None of these conﬂicts covered more than 5%
of India’s territory. We cannot explain diﬀerences between these conﬂicts (in terms
of type, severity, duration, or outcome) if we rely exclusively on country-level
regressors. Clearly, we need to control for sub-national variations since there may be
huge deviations between nation-level statistics and conﬂict-speciﬁc characteristics.
This, we argue, is where GIS will prove useful.
GIS and studies of civil war
Recent developments in GIS have made spatial methodology increasingly
available to users of conventional mapping software. Tools that facilitate ex-
ploratory spatial data analysis (Anselin, 1995) include global and local indicators of
spatial association, variance pattern exploration, and distance analysis. In the social
sciences, spatial analysis has been around for a few decades; O’Loughlin (2003)
4 See Agnew (1994) for a related critique of how theories of international relations implicitly and
exclusively treat states as ﬁxed territorial entities.
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the ﬁrst spatial analysis of political data. Since then, almost all space-oriented
quantitative analyses of political data have focused on voting behavior (O’Loughlin,
2004). In studies of international relations and peace research, spatial analyses are
still quite rare, and GIS is largely an undiscovered tool. Exceptions include Anselin
and O’Loughlin’s (1992) exploration of the contextual eﬀects on conﬂict and
cooperation in Africa, and Starr (2002), who uses GIS to generate indicators of
interaction opportunities and salience of border zones for the case of Israel. Further,
Ward and Gleditsch (2002) develop an autologistic model that estimates the
likelihood of war as a function of recent war involvement of proximate states.
Studying civil conﬂict, Buhaug and Gates (2002) construct a relative location
indicator by using GIS to measure the distance from the conﬂict zones to the capital
cities, while O’Loughlin (2004) uses the same conﬂict location data to illustrate the
spatial overlap between conﬂicts and lack of development. In addition, some recent
studies on diﬀusion patterns employ spatial econometrics (e.g. Gleditsch, 2002;
Gleditsch & Ward, 2000; O’Loughlin et al., 1998; O’Loughlin, 2001).
Civil wars are rarely spatially contiguous. When contiguity is determined by
shared borders, a sample of civil wars will necessarily consist mostly of ‘islands’,
Fig. 1. Territorial intrastate conﬂicts in India in the 1990s. Conﬂict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002),
mountain data from UNEP (2002).
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Although other contiguity measures can be used, such as distance or transport
networks, the exclusion of relevant null-cases (non-conﬂict areas) limits the use of
spatial regression models whenever the civil conﬂict is the unit of observation.
Instead, we shall demonstrate how GIS may enhance conﬂict studies by following
Gleditsch and Ward (2001), Buhaug and Gates (2002), and Starr (2002) in using GIS
software to generate more precise and valid data. However, in contrast to these
contributions, we will not limit our task to the measurement of distance. A major
reason for introducing GIS to the study of conﬂict is that it facilitates data
generation on a truly sub-national level, as opposed to relying on national statistics.
Such measures will undoubtedly improve the validity of traditional regression
models where the conﬂict is (or should be) the unit of observation.
Empirical analysis
Our central hypothesis concerns the suitability of using country-level aggregates
and averages instead of data collected for the actual conﬂict zone in empirical
conﬂict studies. In fact, if the level of measurement (country versus conﬂict) does not
matter for the results, the time-consuming eﬀort to collect data on sub-national level
can be spared, and the data and results obtained by using country-level aggregates
can be regarded as representative. Before presenting the results, we ﬁrst describe how
we used GIS to collect conﬂict-level data on geographical factors linked to civil war.
Data generation
A ﬁrst step towards conducting conﬂict-speciﬁc analyses is to acquire data on the
location of conﬂicts within states. The Armed Conﬂict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002)
provides reasonably accurate geographical data on all interstate and internal
conﬂicts since 1946. Here, each conﬂict is assigned a circular conﬂict zone, deﬁned by
a conﬂict center point (latitude and longitude coordinates) and a radius variable, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. This dataset is currently the only source of systematic
information on the sub-national location of armed conﬂicts. Yet, the circular shape
of the conﬂict zones is a crude approximation. For example, a civil war may take
place mainly along the borders of a country (the Democratic Republic of the
Congo), or the conﬂict zone may be a long but disproportionately narrow area
(Peru). In such cases, the circular operationalization by design exaggerates the real
zone of conﬂict by covering vast areas of unaﬀected land. Even so, it seems fair to
assume that any irregularities in the accuracy of the location data are not correlated
with the explanatory variables.
A valuable byproduct of the location data in the Armed Conﬂict dataset is that
it allows measuring the location of the conﬂict zones relative to other factors of
interest, such as the capital city or neighboring countries. We include one such
measure in the analysis: the conﬂictecapital distance. The relative location of
conﬂict may aﬀect the length of conﬂict at least for two reasons. First, the farther the
conﬂict is from the capital, the more diﬃcult and expensive it is for the government
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remote incidents as less pressing than proximate ones and consequently dedicate less
resources to tackle them.
Several geographical variables that are frequently regarded as aﬀecting war
propensity are available in GIS format. The World Conservation Monitoring Centre
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP-WCMC) recently released
a gridded mountain dataset with global coverage (UNEP, 2002). In this dataset, the
surface of the earth is divided into grid cells of approximately 10! 10 km where
each cell is assigned a value of 1 (mountain) or 0 (no mountain). The gray shades in
Fig. 1 represent mountainous terrain based on UNEP data. Evidently, rough terrain
is not evenly distributed throughout India. The northwestern and northeastern
corners are substantially more mountainous than the central regions. Incidentally,
India’s internal conﬂicts appear to be located in these parts of the country. Whereas
approximately 19% of India’s two-dimensional land mass is characterized as
mountains, the seven conﬂict zones have a joint mean score of 49% mountainous
territory, with Kashmir obviously having the highest score. The proportion of rough
terrain in these conﬂict regions is clearly above the average for the whole country,
and using country-level statistics would thus lead to biased estimates for the eﬀects of
rugged topography. In order to assess the degree of similarity between country- and
conﬂict-level measures of terrain, we have computed the share of mountainous
terrain for all countries and all civil conﬂicts since 1946.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has
collected comparable forest data (FAO, 1999). The released forest map consists
of 1 km2 grids, where each grid is categorized as (1) closed forest, (2) open and
fragmented forest, (3) other wooded land, or (4) other land. From this, we created
a forest dummy where the ﬁrst two categories represent forested terrain. Following
the same procedure as for the mountain data, we then generated a conﬂict-speciﬁc
forest variable that gives the percentage of each conﬂict zone covered by forested
terrain. Both rough terrain measures are logged to avoid outlier bias.
Several recent civil conﬂicts are dominated by the presence of precious natural
resources, such as in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra
Leone (alluvial diamonds), Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan (oil), Afghanistan, Burma,
and Colombia (drugs). Yet, there is a remarkable lack of available systematic
information on the global distribution and signiﬁcance of natural resource deposits.
The World Bank (1997, 2002) has estimated the rents for some renewable and non-
renewable resource production, but these data are aggregated to the country-level
and contain no information on the location of the commodities.
During a conﬂict, some natural resources are more easily exploited by rebels than
others (Ross, 2004b). For example, alluvial diamonds are easy to mine and smuggle,
and can therefore be considered lootable. Such resources constitute a potential
source of ﬁnance for rebel groups. Other resources, such as bauxite mines, are more
diﬃcult for rebels to exploit and can be considered as non-lootable. Gilmore and
Lujala (2003) describe an ongoing project that aims to map the location of selected
types of natural resources. The resulting database will contain information on
location and type, as well as time of discovery and initial extraction. In the analysis
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types of lootable resources: gemstones, coca, cannabis, and opium poppy. Based on
these records, we generated two sets of dummies: one set of country-level variables,
indicating presence of the given commodity in the country at the time of conﬂict
(coded ‘1’ if present and ‘0’ if not), and a conﬂict-speciﬁc set of variables, indicating
the availability of the commodity within the conﬂict area during the conﬂict. Fig. 2
illustrates the distribution of alluvial diamond deposits and the conﬂict zone in
Liberia in 2000. Evidently, the conﬂict and the diamonds overlap. Hence, we can
assume that LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy), the
primary rebel force in Liberia, had access to the highly valuable commodity.
By accounting for the location of conﬂicts relative to the natural resources, and by
considering the temporal component, the research design largely avoids the problem
of endogeneity. In contrast to the common proxy for resource dependence e the
ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP (Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2004; Sachs &
Warner, 1995) e the location of a gemstone deposit is truly exogenous to the model.5
Whereas the total output from a diamond mine might be aﬀected by a nearby
conﬂict, the resource cannot relocate in the face of a civil war. Illicit crops, on the
other hand, can be introduced in new areas and act as a source of ﬁnance, as has
been the case in several contemporary conﬂicts, including Afghanistan. Even so, by
controlling the timing of the conﬂict relative to the introduction of the drug, we can
exclude cases where there was no production (and hence no causal link) at the
outbreak of hostilities.
Population density and ethnic composition are other geographical features that
could be measured at the conﬂict level. The Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University has released gridded population
density data with global coverage for the 1990s (CIESIN, 2000). UNEP (2003) has
comparable population data for previous decades for Africa and Latin America. The
main problem with these databases is the lack of temporal data with global coverage.
Data for other aspects of human geography are even less available. To our
knowledge, the spatial distribution of ethnicity, religion, and culture have so far not
been mapped at a satisfactory level of detail, even for the contemporary world, and
therein lays a huge challenge. Development indicators such as economic growth,
infant mortality rates, and unemployment statistics are other aspects that should be
measured at a sub-national level, as they are likely to inﬂuence the risk and location
of civil unrest. For example, Murshed and Gates (2005) show that the death toll due
5 The habitual resource dependence/ﬁnancial opportunities indicator has been criticized on several
grounds. First, the proxy merges all natural resources together, assuming that they all inﬂuence the
likelihood of conﬂict. Second, for the same reasons that some natural resources are valuable to rebels (e.g.
they are easy to smuggle), some resource exports may be under-reported in the national export statistics
due to extensive illicit trade. The measure is also possibly endogenous since the level of GDP varies in
response to political instability, which often predates civil war. The level and growth of GDP may further
be aﬀected by external factors, including neighboring conﬂict and regional economic shocks, which are
generally not related to the looting opportunities for rebels. Finally, the resource dependence measure
suﬀers severely from non-random missing data.
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districts. Although there appears to be some development and human security data
available at the administrative level, they tend to reﬂect the current situation only
and are generally not available for regions with armed conﬂict. A possible solution
would be to identify and use appropriate instrumental variables. A promising
example is the work by Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), who use rainfall
variation as an instrumental variable for income shock in Africa. Because the
agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa is dominant, changes in rainfall have
a large impact on growth, and thus indirectly on conﬂict. However, rainfall is a poor
indicator of growth in other, more developed parts of the world, so it will not work
as a global proxy for economic development.
Rainfall data can be relevant, however, to the study of conﬂict in a more
straightforward manner. Several regions throughout the world experience rainy
seasons that eﬀectively hinder road transportation. Consequently, ﬁghting becomes
less intensive and often stops altogether for several months. This provides
opportunities for the ﬁghting parties to regroup, rearm, train, and recruit forces,
as well as time to raise funds for warfare. Based on precipitation data from the
Fig. 2. Conﬂict zone and diamond production in Liberia, 2000. Conﬂict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002),
diamond data from Gilmore and Lujala (2003).
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indicators for rainy seasons at both levels of measurement. Areas that experience at
least one month with average daily precipitation in excess of 8 mm are considered as
having rainy seasons.
Empirical test: comparison of sample means
The following two sections compare operationalizations of geography at the
country level with corresponding conﬂict-speciﬁc measures. A paired t-test of sample
means serves as the initial analysis. We run the t-test for two samples. The full
sample consists of 252 civil conﬂicts between 1946 and 2001, taken from the Armed
Conﬂict dataset.7 In addition, we run a test for a restricted sample of relatively small
conﬂicts, where the deviation to the country aggregates is presumably most evident.
In this context, a conﬂict is considered relatively small if the spatial extent of the war
is less than 10% of the country in which it is located. About 40% of the sample (97
conﬂicts) is below this arbitrary cut-oﬀ point. The null hypothesis of the t-test is that
the mean values of the country variables are equal to the means of the corresponding
conﬂict variables. For the terrain measures, the signiﬁcance test is two-tailed, since
we have no a priori expectation of deviation in a particular direction. The mean
values of the resource variables can vary in only one direction (the conﬂict-level
variables cannot have higher means than the country statistics), hence a one-tailed
test. The results are presented in Table 1.
Looking at the full sample ﬁrst, we ﬁnd very strong evidence that most conﬂict
zones do not simply mirror the geographical characteristics of the host countries.
The mean value of every single geographical feature diﬀers signiﬁcantly between the
levels of measurement. More speciﬁcally, the conﬂict zones are e contrary to general
belief e less mountainous and forested than the countries in which they occur, and
most are not located in resource-rich areas. Even in countries that possess easily
exploitable resources, nearly half of the conﬂicts do not overlap with the lootable
resources. Moving our attention to the restricted sample, we note that the mean
diﬀerences have increased for all but one variable. This implies that relatively smaller
conﬂicts e that is, conﬂicts that aﬀect only a fraction of the country e are
particularly likely to have characteristics that diﬀer from the average ﬁgures of the
countries. For these conﬂicts, the reliance on country statistics is particularly
problematic.
Empirical analysis: duration of civil war
The paired t-tests demonstrated that the alternative measures yielded diﬀerent
results, but how substantial are the discrepancies? We can better answer this question
6 See http://cics.umd.edu/wyin/GPCP/main.html.
7 We follow Buhaug and Gates (2002) in treating contests over the same issue between the same parties
as separate conﬂicts if the incidents are separated by at least two calendar years without recorded conﬂict.
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output for three models of civil war duration. The table reports the accelerated
failure-time coeﬃcients. A negative estimate implies that the hazard of failure e that
is, the likelihood of the conﬂict ending e is higher than the reference. Hence,
negative coeﬃcients are associated with shorter conﬂicts. We include four control
variables that might create omitted variable bias if excluded: country size (logged),
population size (logged), issue of incompatibility (dummy, 1 if territory), and
a binary indicator of initial intensity (1 if at least 1000 battle-deaths were reported
during the ﬁrst year of the conﬂict).8
The ﬁrst two models include country-level measures of geography and diﬀer only
with respect to choice of resource proxies. Model 1 includes Sachs and Warner’s
(1995) well-known measure of primary commodity exports to GDP, whereas the
second model uses dummies for speciﬁc types of commodities. Because of missing
export data, Model 1 loses about one-third of the conﬂicts. Model 3 relies on
conﬂict-speciﬁc variables of terrain, climate, and resources, and additionally includes
the relative location measure, the conﬂictecapital distance.
By comparing the ﬁrst two models, we see that the resource dependence proxy and
most of the various resource dummies fail to make an impact on the duration of civil
war. Still, there are notable diﬀerences between the models. Whereas the coeﬃcient
for the ratio of commodity exports to GDP hints at a negative association, three of
the four resource dummies produce estimates in the expected positive direction. In
fact, Model 2 oﬀers some evidence that countries with gemstone deposits experience
somewhat longer civil wars. Moreover, the aim of the opposition e territorial versus
governmental control e only makes an impact on the second country-level model.
This is not due to the increased sample size but rather because the territorial dummy
is negatively correlated with coca (rZ0.22) and cannabis (rZ0.16). The other
Table 1
Paired t-test of sample means
All conﬂicts (NZ 252) Small conﬂicts (NZ 97)
Mean
country
Mean
conﬂict
D Mean S.E. p Mean
country
Mean
conﬂict
D Mean S.E. p
Mountain (log) 3.16 2.91 0.26 0.07 !0.001 3.16 2.71 0.46 0.15 !0.001
Forest (log) 2.83 2.60 0.23 0.06 !0.001 2.97 2.55 0.42 0.12 !0.001
Rainy season 0.40 0.37 0.04 0.01 !0.001 0.41 0.36 0.05 0.02 0.012
Gemstones 0.42 0.21 0.21 0.03 !0.001 0.49 0.07 0.42 0.05 !0.001
Coca 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.042 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.079
Cannabis 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.023 0.03 0.03 0 0 e
Opium 0.23 0.10 0.13 0.02 !0.001 0.35 0.10 0.25 0.05 !0.001
Note: Small conﬂicts are deﬁned as covering less than 10% of the country area.
8 The population data are taken from COW’s National Material Capability dataset, v.3.0 (Singer,
Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). The country size variable is based on the World Bank’s (2002) World
Development Indicators. The incompatibility and intensity dummies are from the Armed Conﬂict dataset
(Gleditsch et al., 2002).
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terrain in the country is positively associated with the duration of conﬂict, whereas
densely forested countries tend to have shorter conﬂicts, ceteris paribus. Conﬂicts in
countries with distinct rainy seasons are longer on average, supporting our notion
that seasonal pauses are exploited to gather strength and prepare for renewed
hostilities. Conﬂicts that immediately reach a high level of violence are also harder to
resolve. Finally, the size of the conﬂict-ridden country appears to be irrelevant.
Model 3 presents the results of the conﬂict-speciﬁc regression analysis. Several
ﬁndings deserve attention. First, the weakly signiﬁcant eﬀect of gemstones found in
the second model is considerably larger and stronger when measured at the conﬂict
level. Evidently, civil wars that occur in regions with gemstones are substantially
harder to bring to an end. We also see that coca, another highly valuable
commodity, has a signiﬁcant impact in the expected direction. However, we must be
cautious about making overly general statements from this ﬁnding since only three
countries in our sample, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, are coded as coca producers.
Third, the positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimates of the mountain variable in
the country-level models are misleading; there is no link between the degree to which
a conﬂict occurs in the mountainous terrain and its expected duration. The
unexpected negative eﬀect of forest prevails, though. The most inﬂuential factor in
the conﬂict-speciﬁc model is the relative location. Civil wars that occur at a distance
from the capital e the presumed center of state power e are much more likely to
turn into protracted contests than relatively proximate ones. The inclusion of the
conﬂictecapital distance further removed most of the explanatory power of the
Table 2
Weibull regression of duration of civil war
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Country level Country level Conﬂict level
Country size (log) 0.108(0.166) 0.013(0.139) 0.365**(0.153)
Population (log) 0.047(0.148) 0.109(0.123) 0.215(0.131)
Territorial conﬂict 0.565(0.362) 0.977***(0.300) 0.551*(0.334)
Initial intensity 0.744*(0.388) 0.682**(0.292) 0.689**(0.299)
Mountain (log) 0.291*(0.164) 0.258*(0.152) 0.022(0.102)
Forest (log) 0.323**(0.133) 0.376***(0.119) 0.242***(0.088)
Rainy season 1.257***(0.453) 1.107**(0.428) 0.590(0.385)
Commodity exports/GDP 0.245(0.146)
Gemstones 0.648*(0.352) 0.885***(0.336)
Coca 0.999(1.164) 2.901*(1.523)
Cannabis 0.385(0.403) 0.151(0.509)
Opium 0.153(0.459) 0.192(0.472)
Conﬂictecapital distance (log) 0.573***(0.115)
Intercept 0.768(1.459) 0.957(1.233) 1.919*(1.146)
N 1006 1482 1482
# Conﬂicts 178 252 252
Wald Chi2 26.37 41.94 85.54
Note: The table reports accelerated failure-time coeﬃcients with standard errors (adjusted for clustering
on country) in parenthesis. *p! 0.1; **p! 0.05; ***p! 0.01.
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a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect. The estimates for the remaining variables do not diﬀer
substantively from the country-level models.
Summing up, Table 2 demonstrates that the scale of measurement aﬀects not only
standard errors and signiﬁcance levels but even the substantive impact of some
regressors. In particular, the shifting behaviors of mountains, gemstones, and coca
imply that using country-level aggregates as proxies for geographical characteristics
of civil wars is indeed a dubious procedure. The analysis also uncovered the
importance of controlling for the relative location of the conﬂict, which in addition
to aﬀecting the expected duration of conﬂict also inﬂuences the estimated impact of
other variables, such as country size and type of incompatibility.9
Future research
As we have demonstrated, GIS-generated geographical data measured for each
conﬂict zone e undoubtedly being more accurate and representative that country-
level statistics e can easily be included in conventional statistical models of civil war.
The analyses above illustrate the potential problem with analyses of civil conﬂict
conducted at the country level. Yet, more work is required to fully gauge the impact
on various aspects of civil war, including use of more advanced methods that
account for spatial autocorrelation and interaction, such as spatial regression and
multilevel analysis, even at the country-level analysis (see, for example, Raleigh,
2004). However, by using data on conﬂict location, diﬀusion and neighborhood
eﬀects of civil wars can be studied at the correct regional level. For example, a test of
spillover eﬀects on neighboring countries could be restricted to a sample of countries
near the conﬂict, or the neighbors could be weighted according to their inverse
distance from the conﬂict zone. This enables the exclusion or downgrading of
irrelevant neighbor countries like Finland and China when exploring the neighbor-
hood eﬀects from the Chechen conﬂict. When more data becomes available, such as
annual death rates and refugee ﬂows, we will be able to analyze other aspects of
a conﬂict’s destructiveness besides duration.
One of the challenges is the choice of the unit of observation. The conﬂict zone
can be used as the base unit in cases when we analyze duration of conﬂict, type of
conﬂict, conﬂict termination, and location of conﬂict. However, analysis of risk
of conﬂict requires a unit of observation that includes null cases (cases without
conﬂict), which renders conﬂict-speciﬁc variables inappropriate. One alternative
strategy is to use ﬁrst-order administrative units as the focal point of data generation
and analysis. Subject to data availability, such a research design facilitates more
precise testing of several prevailing theories on causes of civil war, such as whether
9 This ﬁnding implies that some measure of relative location should be included in any study of duration
of civil war. Although only the Armed Conﬂict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) currently includes data on
location of conﬂict zones, users of other conﬂict data could quite easily code a simple, binary indicator that
distinguishes between proximate and distant conﬂicts.
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terrain, and near state borders. Unfortunately, the size and number of the units diﬀer
greatly from country to country. For example, most of Niger’s departments (ﬁrst-
order sub-national units) are larger than Rwanda and Burundi combined. Hence,
it may not be meaningful to divide all countries into smaller units, in particular if
the sub-national units do not vary with respect to the dependent variable and the
geographical covariates. Moreover, sub-national administrative units are subject to
frequent changes.
A second possible strategy is to deﬁne a geometric unit, like a 100 km! 100 km
grid, as the basis for measurement, and assign values for conﬂict and the explanatory
variables to each pixel. This solves the problem of huge variations in unit size while
simultaneously permitting the same detailed level of analysis as the administrative
unit approach. Unfortunately, sub-national data for income level, infant mortality
rate, and other space-varying factors are typically given only for administrative
units e if available at all e and must be converted to the crude grid format.
Although this could be done by calculating average weighted values based on the
relative share of the administrative entities within each grid cell, we still have the
problem of huge missing data on the sub-national level. Besides, the grid approach is
less intuitive than the administrative level, and policy implications will necessarily be
less apparent.
Yet another alternative is to employ point pattern analysis (PPA). PPA does not
allow studying of risk of conﬂict per se, but facilitates exploring patterns of conﬂict
onset without including null cases explicitly in the model. By using the centroid of
the conﬂict polygon or the location of rebel headquarters as the unit, one can, for
example, measure the distances from any conﬂict to nearby conﬂicts and assess
whether the spatial distribution of conﬂicts diﬀers signiﬁcantly from a random
distribution. Ideally, the analysis should also incorporate the time dimension since
conﬂicts in a region may also cluster temporally. In fact, there are good reasons to
assume that conﬂicts do cluster in both space and time (Anselin & O’Loughlin, 1992;
Ward & Gleditsch, 2002). First, the underlying causes of conﬂict, such as level of
economic development, type of political institutional arrangements, and aspects of
physical geography, also tend to cluster spatially and temporally. Second, a civil
conﬂict is likely to increase the risk of additional conﬂicts in the region by means of
destabilizing the economy, creating refugee ﬂows, facilitating smuggling, and
increasing availability of arms. Therefore, more rigorous point pattern models
should be used. They should either incorporate the underlying variables in the model
or compare the conﬂict surface to the distribution of relevant conﬂict-promoting
variables. For example, one could explore whether conﬂicts follow the distribution of
rough terrain, and if so, whether there is any unexplained clustering of conﬂict left
once the terrain is controlled for.
PPA can be used to verify that conﬂicts tend to cluster, to obtain more nuanced
analysis of conﬂict clustering, and to distinguish between the two forces driving
clustering: clustering of underlying causes of conﬂict and spatial interaction between
conﬂicts. However, conﬂicts are by nature events that cover considerable areas, and
they can hardly be described as points even on a small-scale map. Moreover, the
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some diﬃcult methodological issues concerning how the various exogenous surfaces
should be generated and how they can be compared to the conﬂict distribution. An
additional methodological problem arises from the fact that the study of conﬂict
tends to cover the entire globe. Hence, the researcher must resolve the issue of how to
deal with non-contingent regions, separated by big lakes, seas, and oceans.
Final remarks
A large obstacle to testing the relationship between geography and civil conﬂict
lies in the shortcomings of the available data. One of the most acute problems is the
lack of relevant data at the sub-national level. This is true both for conﬂicts and for
factors that may explain conﬂict propensity and conﬂict characteristics. Neverthe-
less, this article has shown that with relatively simple methods, the researcher can
generate richer and more accurate data for large-scale statistical analyses. A paired t-
test of sample means demonstrated that the seven geographic variables all diﬀered
signiﬁcantly between the scales of measurement, and the deviation was particularly
apparent in the sub-sample of relatively small conﬂicts. An analysis of duration of
civil war further showed that changing from the national to the sub-national scale
did have noticeable consequences. The shifting behavior of gemstones, coca
cultivation, and mountain variables were particularly striking. Evidently, country-
level measures are not always representative for the circumstances in the conﬂict
areas. The analysis also demonstrated the importance of conﬂict location in relation
to capital. Besides having the largest individual impact on duration, the conﬂicte
capital distance measure also aﬀected the estimated eﬀects of country size, type of
incompatibility, and rainy season. Therefore, researchers of civil war should strive to
generate more precise proxies for the theoretical concepts related to geography, and
always control for the relative location of the conﬂicts. This work, we believe, is
facilitated by the use of GIS.
This article has demonstrated the data-generating capability of GIS. However, the
potential contribution of GIS to conﬂict research goes well beyond overlays and area
calculations. By selecting an appropriate unit of analysis, GIS and spatial
econometrics will provide much better instruments for assessing the true spatial
relationship between geography and civil war.
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